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that liberalizing access to service markets was a  the GATS help governments trying to make their
potentially low-cost, effective method for improving  service sectors more efficient? Is the result of the
the quality and efficiency of domesti;  service sectors.  defensive negotiating strategy that was pursued
These unilateral policy develor7ments increased the  consistent with the shift toward a policy of liberalizing
incentives for developing countries as a group to  service markers?
participate  in a multilazera; agreement to liberalize  This issue is of par;icular relevance insofar as recent
trade in services.  liberalization-plis-privatization  programs in
Hoekman  explores the extent to which the initial  developing countries were driven by external  forces
negotiating positions of developing countries are  rather than domestic pressure (industry) groups -
reflected in the draft General Agreement on Trade in  which might reduce the credibility of liberalization
Services (GATS) that has emerged from the Uruguay  policies. Membership in a binding multilateral
Round negotiations.  He investigates whether the  agreemenit could help bolster reform efforts by
unilateral policy changes implemented by many  increasing the costs of "backsliding."
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*  I am grateful  to Carlos  Primo Braga and Gary Sampson for helpful  comments and suggestions on an earlier
draft.  This paper  draws in part upon on a report that is incorporated  in Chapter V of United Nations/World
Bank, Liberalizing  International  Transactions  in Services:  A Handbook,  forthcorming.1
I. Introduction
After more than five years of intensive  discussions,  a draft General Agreement  on Trade
in Services was included as part of the December 20, 1991 Draft Final Act of the Uruguay
Round of multilateral  trade negotiations  (the so-called "Dunkel"  text).'  While the ultimate  fate
of the Uruguay round remains uncertain, it is unlikely that the text of the draft GATS will
become a  source of controversy in  the end-game phase.  There are ongoing negotiations
regarding the initial commitments  (i.e., offers) that are a critical part of the total package. The
final phase of negotiations  on initial commitments  may give rise to disagreements  and perhaps
even lead to a breakdown  cf discussions, but this is unlikely  to be the case for the Articles of
the Agreement, sectoral annexes and other attachments. In itself, this is already a substantial
achievement,  given that a number of developing  countries were opposed to including services
on the agenda of the round.  Having been unsuccessful  in this regard, these countries initially
pursued a defensive strategy during the negotiations. Thus, arguments were made that lack of
data made it impossible to engage in substantive  discussions, that market access concessions
should be granted on a non-reciprocal  basis, and that developing  country governments  should
remain free to discriminate against foreign service suppliers.
In the late 1980s  many developin, countries experienced  something  of a paradigm shift,
in that governments  began to pursue more market  oriented  domestic  policies. Factors underlying
this shift included payments crises related to large external debt servicing obligations, the
demonstration  effect of the South-east  Asian industrializing  nations, the economic collapse  of
Eastern  Europe and the  former Soviet Union,  and advice by  the  international financial
institutions. Countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia  and Nigeria initiated
programs to privatize state-owned  enterprises and liberalize  their foreign trade and investment2
investment  regimes. 2 While the intensity  with which such  programs were pursued varied across
countries, the trend was in the same direction. As far as the service sector was concerned, there
was increasingly a  perception that inefficient service industries constituted a  drag  on the
economy, and that liberalizing  access to ser, ice markets was a potentially  low cost and Jffective
method of improving the quality and efficiency  of domestic service sectors.
These unilateral  policy developments  increased the incentives  for developing  countries as
a group to participate in a  multilateral agreement to liberalize trade in  services.  Such an
agreement would allow governments to "lock in" domestic policy changes, while at the same
time obtaining "credit" for these changes  in the form of increased  opportunities  to access foreign
service markets. 3 The changes in domestic  policy occurred in many of the countries that were
initially strongly  opposed to  multilateral disciplines for  services.  Consequently, these
developments  enhanced the likelihood  of negotiating  a far-reaching multilateral agreement to
liberalize trade in services.
An analysis of the draft GATS  reveals that its scope  is limited, however. In large part this
reflects the preferences  of OECD countries. But developing  countries also continued to pursue
a cautious negotiating  stance throughout the post-1988  period.  The unilateral policy changes
noted earlier are reflected to only a limited extent in the outcome of ne,otiations.  Indeed, the
draft GATS can be characterized as consisting of a mix of elements drawn from the initial
position papers presented by participants in 1987-88.  While it is certainly the case that the
influence of developing countries in multilateral trade negotiations  is generally limited, the
GATS negotiating  history illustrates both the substantial inertia that characterizes negotiating
positions in such efforts and that developing  countries do have some influence  in determining
the final outcome.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to explore the extent to which initial negotiating3
positions  of developing  countries are reflected  in the draft final outcome  and to discuss whether
the unilateral policy changes implemented  by many developing  countries in the late 1980s  had
a discernable  impact on their negotiating  stances  and on the framework  agreement. Second,  to
discuss the potential relevance of the draft GATS for developing  countries.  Given that many
developing  countries  are pursuing  regulatory  reform  and liberalization  efforts, to what extent  will
signing the GATS help governments  seeking  to enhance the efficiency  of their service sectors?
Is  the  result  of  the negotiating strategy that was pursued consistent with the  pursuit of
liberalization of  service markets?  This  issue is of  particular relevance insofar as  recent
liberalization-cum-privatization  programs  of developing  countries  were driven by exturnal  forces
rather than domestic pressure (industry) groups (Birch and Braga, 1993). Given that this may
reduce the credibility  of such reforms, membership in a binding multilateral  agreement could
heln to bolster reform efforts by increasing  the costs of "backsliding."
The paper is organized as follows. Section  II first discusses  briefly the initial negotiating
positions of the major developing  countries, the United States and the EC.4 It then goes on to
explore the extent to which developing  country negotiating  stances shifted in the late 1980s.
Section III  summarizes the  principal features and provisions of  the agreement from the
perspective of developing countries, while Section IV relates the outcome of discussions as
eimibodied  in the draft GATS to their negotiating  positions. Section V turns to the initial specific
liberalization  commitments  made  by participants. These commitments  vll  largely  deternine the
immediate economic impact of  the  GATS on  developing countries,  and provide another
indication  of the extent to which unilateral  policy developments  are reflected  at the multi;ateral
level.  Section VI tums to the general opportunities  for developing  countries embodied in the
GATS, focusing on its rules and disciplines.  The question posed is the extent to which the
credibility of (ongoing) liberalization  programs may be enhanced through participation  in the4
GATS.  Section VII concludes.
II.  Synopsis of Negotiating Positions 5
Before the 1986 Ministerial meeting at Punta del Est_ establishing tne agenda of the
Uruguay  round, a group of ten developing  countries  defended  the view that GATT negotiations
should not address services.'  While these countries did not manage to block the inclusion  of
services on the round's agenda, they did succeed in putting services on a separate track in an
attempt to establish the principle that no cross-issue linkages be possible between traditional
GATT issues and services.  Moreover, at their insistence economic  development  and growth
were agreed to be an objective of any agreement. 7 Many developing countries continued to
express doubts about the value of a multilateral  agreement  liberalizing trade in services during
the first year of discussions.  Submissions  by Argentina, Brazil and India to the Group of
Negotiations  on Services  (GNS)  in 1987  and the first half of 1988  are representative  of the initial
negotiating positions of the major developing countries.'  The primary criterion for these
countries was that any agreement further the goal of  economic development and growth.'
Argentina and India argued that this objective could be best met through market sharing
arrangements, so as to ensure that developing  countries increased their share of world trade in
services.  An Argentinean submission  was also representative  in emphasizing  that developing
countries remain unconstrained with  respect to  regulatory regimes pertaining to  service
industries,  including  possible  export promotion  schemes. Many dt;veloping  countries  emphasized
that lack of statistical  in'formation  made it impossible  to determine  how trade should be defined
for purposes of an agreement.  Data limitations were used as one justification for seeking to
exclude service transactions involving establisliment by  foreign providers  (foreign direct
investment -- FDI).'°  Similarly, it was argued that agreement on a definition of trade in5
services was required before substantive  negotiations  could commence regarding the sectoral
coverage  of the agreement. Great emphasis  was put on the need for governments  to be able to
address restrictive business practices, impo e conditions of inward FDI, and support infant
industries.  A consequence  of this was that a generally  applicable  national treatment obligation
was considered to be unacceptable.
The EC's initial negotiating  position was that trade should be defined so as to include all
types of transactions necessary in a sector in order to achieve "effective" market access.  It
sought a broad agreement  both in terrns of sectoral coverage  ard membership. A "regulations
committee"  was proposed that would determine  ihe "appropriateness"  of regulations, criteria to
determine  this to be negotiated. Inappropriate  measures  were to be subject  to liberalization  over
time, the goal being to achieve "comparable"  market access on a sector-by-sector  basis for all
participating countries.  Any framework agreement was not to  involve generally binding
obligations.  Instead, national treatment and other principles were to be objectives.  The
implication  of this was that any binding commitments  were to apply on a sector-specific  level.
The  United  States'  init:. !  proposal  centered  on  five  elements:  transparency,
nondiscrimination, national treatment, market  access and  disciplines on  state-sanctioned
monopoly  providers of services. MFN was to apply to all signatories  to the agreement,  but not
to non-members. Transparency  of regulations  and procedures was also a component  of other
submissions, and was an uncontroversial  concept.  National treatment was considered to be a
fundamental  element of any agreement,  and was to be a binding, general obligation. While  the
existence of national monopolies  was accepted, the U.S. proposed that services sold by such
entities be provided to foreign-based  users on a nondiscriminatory  bas.s.  Trade was to be
defined broadly, including  FDI (commercial  presence), as this was considered to be crucial to
ensure market access. All measures  limiting market access for foreign service providers were6
to be put on the table.  At the time (late 1987), rany  developing  countries felt that the U.S.
submission  went beyond the mandate of the GNS (7obban, 1988).
After two years of  discussions, a  mid-term rev-ew session was held in  Montreal at
ministerial  level."  The resulting Montreal Ministerial Declaration  emphasized  the interests of
developing  countries with respect to services. Although tstated that work on definitions  should
include longer-term establishment  as a covered mode of supply, developing country concerns
were reflected in the possibility  of imposing  various criteria in this connection. In determining
the sectoral coverage of the agreement sectors of export interest to developing  countries were
to be included. Progressive liberalization  -- called for in the Punta del Este declaration  -- was
to  take  "due  account of  the  level of' development of  signatories," and  there  should be
"appropriate  flexibility  for individual  developing  countries  for opening  fewer  sectors or liberalize
fewer  types of transactions ...  in line with their development  situation."' 2
Throughout  1989  and 1990  developing  countries  consistently  def.ended  the position  that  the
language of  the  Montreal declaration be  respected.  The need for preferential access to
industrialized  country markets .,  as emphasized,  as was the option of limited reciprocity (i.e.,
the freedom of liberalizing fewer sectors).  A February 1990 paper submitted  bv a number of
Latin American states -- including  Brazil, Chile and Mexico -- is representative. It identihed
a number of ways through  which  developing  countries might be accorded  preferential  treatment
in line with meeting  the objective  of economic  development. These included  the right to pursue
policies  to foster service exports,  a general reservation  of the right to grant subsidies  to domest:.
service sectors, making market access concessions conditional  on permission for developing
countries to  exempt export subsidies from a  national treatment obligation, tolerating the
formation of preferential trading arrangements  among developing  countries, financial aid for
technical assistance relating to  matters covered by a  services agreement and to  foster the7
de-elopment of service sector infrastructure, and obligations  on industrialized  countries to bind
and  progressively  reduce  discrimination in  government procurement practices. 13 It  is
noteworthy  that much of this was eventually  incorporated  into the draft Final Act of the Uruguay
Round.
The foregoing is not to say that negotiating  positions remained  i nchanged  between 1987-
91.  On  issues  such  as  definition and  coverage,  developing countries  became  more
accommodating,  accepting  a broad  definition  of trade in services and putting much  less  emphasis
on the lack of a detailed databasc  on service statistics. Indeed, the initial breakthrough  was the
developing  country acceptance  that the definition  of trade in services irclude the four possible
modes through  which intemational  transactions  in services  may occur, at the price of acceptance
of a positive list approach to determining  the coverage of specific commitments  (see below)." 4
Bu. the summary of the provisions of the GATS contained in the next section illustrates that
developing  countries continued to insist on the inclusion  of the "acquired rights" pertaining  to
preferential treatment embodied in the Montreal Ministerial declaration.
III. An Overview of the Draft GATS
The draft GATS contains  two sets of obligations:  (1) a set of general concepts, principles
and rules that create obligations  that apply to all measures  affecting trade in services; and (2)
specific  negotiated  obligations  that constitute  commitments  that apply to those  service  sectors and
subsectors that  are  listed  in  a  member country's  schedule,  subject  to  sector-specific
qualifications,  conditions  and limitations. The Agreement  also contains  a set of attachments  that
include  annexes  that take into account  sectoral  specificities  and various institutional  decisions  and
understandings.
The GATS applies to measures affecting trade in services, "services" being defined to8
include any  service in  any  sector except those supplied in  the exercise of governmental
functions." 5 Article I distinguishes four 'modes of supply" to which the Agreement applies.
These are the cross-border supply of a service (that is, not :equiring the physical movement  of
supplier or consumer); provision implying movement  of tFz consumer to the location of the
supplier; services sold in the territory of a Party by (legal) entities that have established a
presence  there but originate in the teriTtory  of another Party; and provi' ton of services  requiring
the temporary  movement  of natural persons (service suppliers  or persons employed  by a service
supplier who is a rational of a country that is a party to the agreement).
Article AI  on unconditional  MFN is a core general obligation  of the Agreement. MFN is
defined as non-discrimination .cross  foreign sources of supply, i.e.,  each service or service
supplier from another  party is treated  no less favorably  than any other foreign service  or service
supplier.  It applies to al! services. The extent to which  existing measures  that do not conform
with MFN will be "multilateralized"  depends  on the extent to which countries  seek exemptions.
For a variety of reasons, it proved necessary  to include  an annex allowing  signatories  to exempt
certain measures  from the MFN obligation." 6 As the content of the lists of exemptions  are still
under review at the time of writing, it remains unclear to what extent the GATS will be
undermined  by MFN exemptions.
Other general obligations include the following: (1) Transparency:  all relevoat laws,
regulations and administrative  guidelines  to be publi'  -d, and enquiry points to be established
within two years of the entry into force of the agreement." 7 Such enquiry  points are to provide,
upon request, specific information  on any of the laws, regulations, etc. which pertain to the
operation of the agreement.  (2) Economic integration: GATS membership will not prevent
parties  from  belonging to  agreements to  liberalize trade  in  services among or  between
themselves, providing certain conditions relating to sectoral coverage, new discriminatory9
measures, etc. are met).18 (3) Recognition: allows for harmonization  or mutual recognition
arrangements  between members  of thle GATS of standards,  qualifications,  licenses,  certification
systems, etc.  through negotiations or  autonomous .ecognition.  (4) Domestic regulation:
recognition  of a country's rig:t to regulate, and provisions  to ensure that standards  and licensing
requirements  - so-caJ'ed  qualitative  conditions  on market access - do not constitutc  unnecessary
barriers to  trade or  nullify specific commitments  contained in  the national schedules. (5)
Behavior of public  monopolies: such entitics will be  subject to  the MFN obligation and
prohibited from abusing their monopoly  power.  (6) Behavior  of private  operators:  agreement
to  consult with a  view to  remov-ng business practices that restrain  competition, and a
requirement  to provide  information  on business  practices. (7) Emerge cy safegua is: procedures
to be negotiated within three years should such a provision be considered necessary.  (8)
Freedom  for  transfers and payments  for  current transactions:  for  those sectors where
commitments  have becn undertaken.  xcept if necessary  to safeguard  the balance  of payments.
(9) Balance of payments safeguards:  may be taken subject to consultations.' 9 (10) Subsidies:
recognition  that subsidies  may have distortive effects on trade in services and that theri will be
future negotiat ons to develop  the necessary  multilateral  disciplines. (11) Exceptions:  analogous
to GATT Article XX, allowance  for measures  to be maintained  or taken to protect public  health,
morals and safety.
There are three articles in Part III of the GATS  on Specific  Commitments,  entitled Market
Access, National Treatment, and Additional Commitments (Articles XVI, XVII and XVIII
respectively) that apply only to listed service sectors and subsectors. 20 Market access is not
defined  as an obligation. Instead, an "implicit"  approach  was followed:  if a party lists a sector
or subsector in its schedule, market access (in all four modes of delivery) is considered to be
unrestricted except for those limitations  and conditions  (discriminatory  and nondiscriminatory10
measures) explicitly listed which pertain to specific modes of supply.  National treatment for
foreign services  and service suppliers  is defined  as treatment  no less favorable  than that  accorded
to like domestic  services and service suppliers. Such treatment may or may not be identical to
that applying to domestic firms, in recognition of the fact that in some instances identical
treatment may actually worsen the conditions of competitior for foreign-based  firms (e.g., a
requirement for insurance firms that reserves be held locally).  As is the case with the market
access commitment,  countries may list any conditions  and qualifications  to national treatment
in their schedules.
There are currently five annexes to the framework. These comprise the annex on Article
II  (MFN)  exemptions  mentioned  earlier,  sectoral  annexes  for  financial  services,
telecommunications,  and air transport, and an annex dealing with the movement of natural
persons providing services covered by the framework.  The annex of primary concern to
developing  countries  deals with the i.ovement of natural  persons, as many  developing  countries
are perceived  to have a comparative  advantage  in labor intensive  products, and many services
are labor intensive (Bhagwati, 1987). The annex specifies  that natural persons who are either
service suppliers themselves,  or employed by a service supplier originating  in a country that is
a party to the GATS shall be allowed to provide services in accordance with the terms of
specific  commitments  relzting to entry and temporary stay of such persons.  As with national
treatment/market  access, the extent to which  labor movement  is allowed  is completely  dependent
on what is specified  in the natioial schedules. Specific  restrictions on labor movement  may be
horizontal  in nature (e.g., a domestic  means test for all incoming  labor) or sector-specific. The
annex emphasizes  that the GATS does not apply to measures  affecting natural persons seeking
access to the employment  market  of a country, or to measures  regarding  citizenship,  residence,
or employment  on a permanent  basis.11
Provisions  pertaining to developing  countries
The GATS contains no provisions similar to Part IV of the GATT on more favorable
treatment of developing countries (special and differential treatment), or  to tne (unilateral)
arrangements  for tariff preferences  that exist for merchandise  trade flows (e.g., the Generalized
System of Preferences). Instead, all provisions  relating  to economic  development  are considered
to be an integral element of the agreement. The Preamble of the GATS repeats the Punta del
Este declaration. While it creates no legally binding  obligations, it states that the general goal
of member countries is 'to establish a multilateral  framework of principles and rules for trade
in services with a view to expand such trade under conditions of transparency  and progressive
liberalization,  and as a means of promoting  the economic  growth of all trading partners an( che
development of developing countries."  Moreover, a desire is expressed that the agreement
facilitate  "the increasing  participation  of developing  countries in intemational trade in services
and the expansion of their service exports including, inter alia, through the strengthening  of
domestic service capacities and its efficiency  and competitiveness." The Preamble explicitly
recognizes  the right of all parties to regulate the supply of services within their territories, and
the particular need  of developing  countries  to exercise this right with a view to meeting  national
policy objectives. Finally, the Preamble states that "particular  account  of the serious difficulty
of the least developed  countries" is to be taken.
The major exception to  the general absence of special and differential treatmeat for
developing  countries is Article XIX foreseeing  in developing  countries offering fewer specific
commitments  than  industrialized  nations. Although  they are to have some  flexibility  to offer less
than industrialized nations, they will not be allowed to "free ride," as this is not a right (or
obligation), but is negotiable.  Thus, many industrialized  countries have made clear that no
developing country (including least developed countries) can become a party to  the GATS12
without having made satisfactory initial commitments.  Commitments that are perceived as
unsatisfactory by  a party to  the agreement can lead to the invocation of a  nonapplication
provision, under which a party can refuse to apply the provisions of the GATS to a country that
accedes to it.
There are only two provisions that deal exclusively  with developing  countries. Article IV
entitled "Increasing  Participation  of Developing  Countries"  states that the goal of increasing  the
participation of developing countries in  world trade i  services shall be facilitated through
negotiated" 1 specific commitments  relating to: (1) access to technology  on a commercial  basis;
(2) the improvement of access to distribution  channels and information  networks; and (3) the
liberalization  of market access in sectors of export interest to them. Article IV does not exempt
developing  countries from any of the obligations  of the Agreement. Article XXVI on technical
cooperation states that service suppliers needing assistance are to have access to the contact
points required by Article IV and that technical assistance to developing countries shall be
provided at the multilateral  level by the competent  secretariat  and shall be decided  upon by all
signatories  acting  jointly.  Thus, such assistance  need not be provided solely by the secretariat
of the GATS, but can involve any multilateral  organization  deemed to be competent. 22
Other Articles mentioning the level of economic  development  of parties or referring to
developing  countries  include  Articles  III (transparency),  V (economic  integration),  XII (measures
to safeguard  the balance of payments), XV (subsidies),  and XIX (negotiation  of commitments).
As far as transparency  is concerned,  developed  parties are to establish  contact  points within two
years of the entry into force of the agreement to facilitate the access of developing  country
service suppliers to information  relating to (1) the commercial  and technical  aspects of specific
services;  (2)  requirements  for  registration,  recognition, and  obtaining  of  professional
qualifications;  and (3) the availability  of services technology. This provision goes beyond the13
requirement  to establish  enquiry  points contained  in Article III (on transparency),  as ihose  simply
relate to laws, regulations, decisions,  etc. that affect the supply  of services. The contact  points
for developing  countries also cover technical matters.
Article V on economic integration  allows parties to the GATS to enter into preferential
trade liberalizing  agreements.  Such agreements  are subject to certain conditions,  the major ones
being that they have substantial  sectoral  coverage, provide for national  treatment  for the sectors
involved, and do  not result in higher external barriers for services and service suppliers
originating in non-member  states.  Where developing  countries  are parties to such agreements,
the draft agreement states that "flexibility shall be provided for regarding the conditions in
accordance with the level of development of the countries concerned, both overall and in
individual  sectors and subsectors."
Article XV on subsidies  remains to be negotiated. It simply  recognizes  that subsidies  may
have distortive effects on trade in services and states that parties shall enter into negotiations
with a view to developing  the appropriate multilateral  disciplines  to avoid such trade distortive
effects.  However, it is stated that such negotiations  are to recognize the role of subsidies  in
development  programmes of developing  countries and take into account the needs of parties,
especially developing countries, for flexibility in this area.  It can be argued that as far as
scheduled  sectors are concerned, Article XVII (National  Treatment) will already impose some
subsidy  discipline  as those subsidies  that violate  national  treatment  will have to be listed. It may
well be, therefore, that a subsidies  article will never emerge.
Article XIX states that to  achieve the objectives of  the Agreement, the process of
progressive liberalization through the  future  negotiation of  commitments shall allow for
"appropriate  flexibility  for individual  developing  countries  for opening  fewer  sectors, liberalizing
fewer types  of transactions,  progressively  extending  market  access in line  with their development14
situation and,  when making access to their markets available to  foreign service suppliers,
attaching to it conditions aimed at achieving the objectives" of increasing the participation  of
developing  countries in world trade. These are in fact guidelines  for the conduct of future trade
liberalizing rounds rather than "obligations"  to be undertaken.  Again, specific consideration
should be given to the economic  condition  of least developed  countries, as required by Article
IV (see above).
The only sectoral  annex to make  a reference to the situation  of developing  countries  relates
to telecommunications. This annex requires developed countries to abstain from imposing
conditions  on the access to and use of public  telecommunications  transport networks  and services
unless necessary  to ensure the availability  of services  to the general public, protect the technical
integrity of networks or prevent the supply of services by parties that have not made specific
commitments  in the area of telecommunications. However, developing  countries may impose
reasonable conditions of the access to, and use of, telecommunication  networks necessary to
strengthen  domestic  telecommunications  infrastructure/capacity  and to increase  theirparticipation
in international  trade in telecommunications  services."
IV. Developing Country Iniluences on the Structure  of the Draft GA  TC
As noted above, early in the negotiations  both the EC and major developing  countries
expressed a preference for an agreement  with "soft" obligations  -- the EC arguing that national
treatment should  only apply to specific  sectors, major developing  countries opposing  even that.
Only  the  U.S.  and  certain  small open economies --  both  OECD  members and  newly
industrialized  countries like Singapore  -- were in favor of a "hard" agreement  along GAIT lines
from the start, with generally  binding  obligations  and universal  sectoral  coverage. Although  the
various articles of the GATS dealing with recognition  of licenses, transparency  of regulatory15
regimes, monopolies,  xconomic  integration  and so forth are important, it may not be too much
of an exaggeration to  say that at the  end of  the day the original EC/developing country
preference for a 'soft" framework  agreement  prevailed. The draft GATS  only has one generally
binding obligation -- MFN -- and it allows countries to continue to maintain measures that
violate MFN if these are listed under auspices of the Annex on MFN exemptions.2 4 Other
obligations  pertaining to national treatment  and market access apply only to scheduled  sectors,
and then only to the extent that countries do not list measures  in their sectoral lists that violate
these obligations.
While the non-generality  of national treatment and market access obligations  reflects the
preferences initially expressed by the EC, the positive list approach to the sectoral  coverage  of
the specific commitments  was the result of developing  country opposition to a negative list. 25
In part this reflected a fear that the latter would have imposed too great an administrative
burden.  A negative list approach  -- i.e.,  generally binding obligations  for all sectors with the
exception  only of listed services -- requires all sectors for which exemptions  will be sought to
be scheduled. 26 The developing country preference for a  positive list approach does not
necessarily  reflect a desire to limit the scope of liberalization  commitments,  as the valt e of such
commitments  can be the same under either approach.'  It is nonetheless  one dimension  where
developing  countries had an impact  on the architecture  of the GATS. More fundamental  as far
as developing  countries are concerned  is the inclusion  of Article XIX which allows developing
countries to offer fewer specific commitments. The language of Article XIX comes straight
from the Montreal declaration, which in turn was the result of the initial negotiating  stances
taken by the major developing  countries.
The draft GATS can be characterized  as an elaboration of various elements that were
already contained in  initial submissions by  participants to  the  GNS.  The  fundamental16
architectural aspects of  the draft GATS reflect the preferences of the major industrialized
players.  Thus, the approach taken towards national treatment is consistent with the original
desire of the EC not to have general binding obligations. However, the EC accepted  that MFN
be  a  generally binding obligation, as  this  was considered to  be  crucial by  most other
industrialized  countries.  Although the U.S.  consistently defended the need to have a MFN
obligation, its position on this issue was ambivalent  in practice.  Thus, the U.S. was largely
behind the inclusion of the annex allowing members to invoke exceptions to MFN. 28 The
changes  in the economic  policy stance  of many developing  countries  in the late 1980s  apparently
had little impact on the design and contents of the draft GATS. Its main effect was that major
countries abstained from the defensive, foot dragging strategy employed in the first years of
substantive  negotiations. A priori one expects that even  large developing  countries may  be able
to have only a marginal  impact  at best in influencing  the substantive  provisions of a multilateral
trade agreement.  While this certainly appears to be the case with respect to  the  major
substantive  provisions  of the draft GATS, specific "developing  country" language  was defended
by developing  countries with some success.  Examples include Article XIX, the fact that no
disciplines were negotiated  in the area of subsidies (including  export subsidies, an important
concern  of developing  countries  in the early stages  of discussions),  and the inclusion  of a balance
of payments safeguard  clause.
The  rules and principles of  the  draft GATS constitute one dimension along which
developing  country influence  can be measured.  However, the predominance  of industrialized
countries makes it difficult to discern precisely what impact developing  countries negotiating
positions had over the course of negotiations  in the GNS.  Another indicator of the extent to
which unilateral policy changes were reflected in  the GATS is to investigate the sectoral
coverage of the initial offers made by developing  countries.  It is one thing to include options17
such as Article XIX, but what matters at the end of the day is the extent to which they are
exploited. This is the subject of the next section.
V. Initial Commitments  (Sectoral  Offers) of Developing  Countries
At the time of writing, countries are still in the process of negotiating their specific
commitments.  Recognizing  that final offers might be substantially  expanded  as the result of
further negotiations,  there is nonetheless  value in undertaking  an analysis  of the initial offers that
have been made by participants. They provide an indication  of the willingness of developing
countries to provide significant national treatment/market  access commitments, and also the
extent to which such countries are willing to bind unilateral reforms at the multilateral  level.
As of early 1992, 28 developing  countries  had presented  an initial offer.  In the subsequent  year
an additional 12 countries submitted initial commitments, bringing the total to 40.  All large
developing  countries  including  Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, and
Nigeria have presented an offer. 29
A number of summary  indicators  can be constructed  to compare  country  offers. The most
straightforward is to simply count the number of subsectors mentioned  in an initial offer and
express this as a share of the total number of subsectors in the GATS indicative  list of service
activities. This list distinguishes 11 major service categories and 154 sub-sectors. 30
The initial offers of developing  countries as of the end of 1992 had "coverage  ratios" ranging
from I to 50 percent, the average  being 18.5 percent. There was substantial  geographic  variance
in the offers.  Whereas Latin American countries on average had ratios of 20 per cent, Asian
country offers averaged  22 per cent, and the offers of African  countries  represented  only 11 per
cent of all sub-sectors. Large developing  countries  as a group -- defined as those with a service
sector representing over $100 billion in GDP in 1990 -- had above average coverage ratios of18
25 per cent. 3"  Ten developing countries offered more than 30 per cent of the sub-sectors
identified in the GNS classification  list.
Coverage ratios of this kind are of course extremely crude indicators of the relative
magnitude  of country  offers. They do not take  into account  the restrictions  cn national  treatment
and market access that continue  to be maintained,  or the relative size of countries.  Moreover,
they give each subsector equal weight, something  that is clearly inappropriate. 32 It should  also
be noted that many countries' initial commitments are subject to  so-called headnotes that
maintain  regulations  that apply  across a number  of sub-sectors  or modes  of supply, and may  also
contain  qualifications  with respect to the re-drafting  of relevant  legislation. Finally, the coverage
ratios are somewhat  biased. A number  of countries  have  offered services that are not mendoned
explicitly in the GNS list of service sectors.  These are classified under one of the catchall
subcategories  "other."  In those cases where countries mention  more than one subsector under
a heading of "other" only one is counted in the procedure that is used here.  While the impact
of this source of bias is rather minor, this is certainly not the case for the other problems
mentioned.
It is very difficult to take into account the relative openness - or change in openness -
implied by developing country offers on a sector-by-sector  basis.  One attempt has been in
OECD (1993), which takes into account the proportion of total commitments  where the offer
implies unrestricted access.  For all developing  countries that have made offers, about 50 per
cent are associated  with unrestricted market  access. However, even in such cases national  laws
and regulations remain applicable, and the economic  impact of regulatory regimes will differ
across corntries.  Correcting for sector and country size is more straightforward  in principle,
as offers can be weighted  by the share of each sector in a country's total services output, and
by the share of a country's service sector output in the total of all countries in the sample.19
Unfortunately  no detailed data are reported by individual  countries that allow this to be done in
practice.  What can be done is to concord country offers to a more aggregated  list, and to use
data on sectoral shares for a set of OECD countries reporting the required statistics  as a set of
weights.  When offers are adjusted in this way," the average weighted  coverage ratio across
developing  countries increases slightly to 21 percent.  If the magnitude  of the service sector of
each country in the sample  is also taken into account,  the weighted  average  coverage  ratio across
all countries  jumps to 31 percent. 3'  This reflects the fact that large developing  countries have
offered more than the smaller ones on average.
These summary  measures, while  undoubtedly  very crude, reveal that the sectoral  coverage
of the initial offers of developing  countries  is not insignificant. Even though many developing
countries had not made initial offers as of the end of 1992, the countries that did include the
largest economies. Indeed, the countries  that have made offers represent over two-thirds  of the
total service sector output of all developing  countries (excluding  East-European  countries  and
the republics of the former USSR). 35 It cannot be concluded from the fact that only a limited
number  of developing  countries  made  initial  offers that developing  country  interest in liberalizing
access to service markets is limited. Many smaller developing  - and especially  least developed  -
countries have a rather limited "negotiating  capacity," in that the relative costs of participation
in the Geneva-based  GNS process are simply too high.  For  example, many do not have
permanent representatives  at the GATT who could take part in the service negotiations; 36 or
to the extent tnat they do, they may decide that their limited resources are better utilized in fora
that appear to be of greater direct export interest to them than services  (e.g., tropical  and natural
resource-based  products, textiles, etc.).
Although  in comparison  to their traditional  stance in GAIT  negotiations  the participation
of developing  countries in the services talks was substantial,  it is unclear why the offers are not20
more comprehensive. As noted  earlier, the data on sectoral  coverage provides  little information
on the extent of liberalization or degree of openness of the regulatory regime affecting the
sectors concerned.  In many instances offers consist of binding the status quo for the sectors
involved.  Although this is of some value, especially for those countries that have liberalized
unilaterally, it is clearly only the first step towaras progressive liberalization.  As such, the
"cost" of offering a majority of service activities in the GATS context would appear to be
modest, even for those countries that do not favor liberalization, as measures may be retained
that violate the national treatment or market access obligations  as long as they are scheduled.
This argument applies a fortiori for those countries that do desire to liberalize access to their
service markets.  As far as the latter are concerned  it may well be that markets are relatively
open, but that countries do not desire to bind this situation in the GATS context. Reasons for
this could include dissatisfaction  with the offers of trading  partners, or a desire to maintain  some
negotiating  leverage in both the current and in future negotiations.
Limiting the extent of liberalization  offers so as to induce trading partners to liberalize  in
turn, or liberalize more, is in general not likely to be effective.  Even if the strategy turns out
to be successful, it is likely to take a substantial  amount time (witness the length  of the Uruguay
Round), thereby foregoing  the benefits of liberalization  during this period.  Most countries are
simply too small to be able to influence  the behavior of the large traders."  Nonliberalization
by trading partners reduces the potential  gains from liberalization, but by no means eliminates
them.  This is especially true in the services context, as most service production - be it by
domestic  of foreign firms - occurs locally, employing  domestic  factors of production. Most of
the potential gains to be had from liberalization  will be the result of liberalizing access to
domestic markets. Greater access to foreign markets will frequently  constitute  the "icing on the
cake," not the cake itself. 3 821
Notwithstanding  these normative  considerations,  the possibility  remains that  limited offers
on  the  part  of  developing countries can  be  explained by  limited offers on  the part  of
industrialized  countries.  As of early 1993 all OECD members had presented  an initial offer.
Those of the two major participants  in the negotiations, the EC and the U.S.,3  cover about
two-thirds and one-half of the GNS list of  sectors, respectively.  The average unweighted
coverage ratio of initial offers of industrialized  countries  exceeds 75 percent. 40 Given the wide
coverage of the offers, there is less interest in calculating  weighted  coverage ratios than for the
offers of developing  countries.  The main issue for developing  countries  is what measures  are
retained for scheduled  services in which they have a comparative advantage.
Existing balance-of-payments  data show that many developing  countries have a revealed
comparative advantage  in services (Hoekman  and Karsenty, 1992).41  Unfortunately, the high
level of aggregation  of the data makes it impossible  to determine which sectors are of greatest
export interest - actual or potential  - for developing  countries. Abstracting  from tourism, there
is a general belief that developing  counitries  have a comparative  advantage in labor intensive
products, and that market access for labor intensive services therefore should be of greatest
interest. These include  professional  services such as legal, accounting,  engineering,  consulting,
medical and quasi-medical services as well as activities such as  data processing, software
development  or cleaning services.  Many of these business services are included in the offers
of major industrialized  countries. Thus, in this respect it appears  that developing  countries  may
have gained a significant increase in their export potential.  Even though few countries have
included personal services such as domestic help in initial offers - and are unlikely to do so -
the list of business services  includes many  in which  developing  countries  should  be competitive.
Even if it should turn out that final offers do not go much beyond the status quo regarding visa
and licensing requirements, implementation  of the contact/enquiry point mechanisms should22
enhance  export opportunities. More importantly, the fact that countries are to applv remaining
restrictions on national treatment and market access on an MFN basis should result in a
significant  amelioration  of market  access  conditions,  giveri  that  service  suppliers  from developing
countries may face discriminatory  treatment at present.
Indeed, the potential  benefits of MFN in terms of increasing  market access should  not be
lost from sight.  For example, it seems likely that certain existing bi- or minilateral trade,
investment and related arrangements may be multilateralized. Possible examples are the two
OECD  codes  on liberalization  of current  invisible  operations  transactions  and capital  movements,
respectively, the UNCTAD Liner Code, and existing bilateral commercial  treaties that affect
trade in services, examples including bilateral investment treaties and bilateral "Friendship,
Commerce,  and Navigation"  treaties. The latter frequently  embody  reciprocal  national  treatment
obligations, which would presumably be extended to  all  parties to  the  agreement unless
specifically  exempted  from the MFN requirement. Similarly,  to the extent that OECD  countries
schedule  service sectors/activities  covered by the two codes, and do not exempt this horizontal
measure from MFN, they will accord non-OECD members that are party to GATS with the
same treatment that is accorded to OECD members. 42
VI. General Opportunities for Developing  Countries
Participation  in the GATS presents developing  countries with an opportunity  to increase
the economic efficiency of their service sectors through greater access to lower cost/higher
quality service inputs and increased export opportunities.  In  practice, export and import
opportunities  are strongly  interdependent;  greater access to higher quality  and/or cheaper  service
inputs frequently being a  necessary condition for a  more efficient (competitive) domestic
production  capacity and thus greater exports of services  and goods. Opportunities  in both areas23
will  be  a  function of  the  general obligations contained in  the  GATS and  the  specific
commitments undertaken by parties to the agreemenit  to provide market access and national
treatment to foreign stppliers.
There is  substantial c-idence  that many of  the constraints that reduce the economic
efficiency of service industries  of developing  countries are "home  grown," in that governments
have not always pursued the appropriate policies. 43 Thus, policy measures should focus on
augmenting domestic productive capacity, increasing quality, establishing a  reputation for
reliable supply, etc.  This is the crucr.J  need from a development perspective, as it is a
necessary condition for  exports to  increase, be  it  the  goods which use  the  services as
intermediate  inputs, or the services themselves. In the longer-run, greater exports are in turn
a  necessary condition for greater imports.  Services are often intermediate inputs into the
production of goods, so that the availability  of higher quality and/or lower cost services will
increase the output of goods and make them mure competitive  on world markets.
Although many policies can and should be changed/implemented  unilaterally, external
barriers to both imports and exports may reduce the payoff from doing so.  Extemal barriers to
imports include access to information systems or telecommunication  networks.  For example,
efficient provision of travel services may require agents to have access to the major computer
reservation systems that cover various parts of the world.  If so, the agent needs to be able to
import such services  at the lowest  possible  cost. As international  telecommunications  are subject
to two sets of regulators, foreign  regulations  and  procedures  (relating  to interconnection,  pricing,
etc.) may  reduce the effective  availability  of (access  to) such services. Ideally, external  barriers
to trade should be reauced in a reciprocal fashion, and this is of course the main incentive  for
engaging in reciprocal liberalization  discussions.
Participation in a multilateral  agreement imposing  certain disciplines  and constraints on24
national  policy fo:  -nation  may help a govemment  in pursuing or implementing  desired changes
in domestic  policies. Indeed, this may  well be the primary benefit for a country of participating
in or seeking  to join an international  agreement  such as the GATS. Membership  may increase
both the credibility of initial reform and help governments resist demands from politically
influential  interest groups for altering policies  in the future. This may be the case in particular
for recent regulatory reform efforts undertaken  by a number of Latin American  countries.  As
noted by Birch and Braga (1993), these have tended to be driven by external factors -- e.g.,
external debt --  rather than domestic interest groups (industry and/or consumers).  The
credibility  of reform that is not based on solid domestic  support may be limited. To what extent
does the GATS help governments  desiring to foster economic  efficiency by liberalizing access
to service markets?
While economic  efficiency may require regulation  of some kind, this should not include
restrictions on market access for foreign suppliers.  A necessary condition for increasing the
efficiency  of services (and goods) producton is greater competition  (or the threat thereof).  If
for whatever  reason a government  desires to support  domestic  industries,  the preferred  approach
is to subsidize  such industries, not restrict access for foreign  suppliers. If this is not politically
feasible,  price-based, nondiscriminatory  restrictions  on market  access are preferable  to quantity-
based limitations. The GATS does not inhibit the implementation  of more  efficient  policies, and
in a number of ways will help governments  seeking to adopt such policies  and liberalize  access
to  their  service markets.  The  basic principles that underlie the  GATS revolve around
nondiscrimination,  which is a necessary  (but not sufficient)  condition  for policies  to be efficient.
Although  no general ban on the use of quantitative  restrictions  is embodied  in the GATS (unlike
the GATT), the market access article lists a number of measures  that are in principle not to be
maintained  by parties to the agreement. Most of these are quantity-type  restrictions. Moreover,25
although the GATS recognizes  the possible distortive effects of subsidies on trade in services,
and states that parties are to enter into negotiations  with a view to developing the necessary
multilateral  disciplines, it is recognized that the option to use subsidies may be important for
developing countries and that any disciplines to be developed take into account the need for
flexibility in this area."
Membership  of the GATS  may  help  governments  pursue liberalization  efforts because  such
liberalization  occurs in a multilateral  context.  As domestic maikets are liberalized, so are the
markets of  (potential) trading partners.  This quid pro quo may help offset opposition by
politically powerful forces against domestic liberalization.  A well-known rationale for the
pursuit of multilateral liberalization  efforts is that the increased access to foreign markets is
likely to be of interest to domestic export-oriented  industries, and that these can be expected  to
oppose lobbying  by import-competing  industries  to prevent the opening  of domestic  markets,  as
the less liberalization  that occurs at home, the fewer access opportunities will be ofGered  by
trading partners (Baldwin, 1987). In the services-context  the political  economy  of liberalization
is likely to be more complex than in the case of trade in goods.  Reasons include the fact that
multiple modes of supply  are under discussion,  regulatory  bodies may have a vested interest in
limiting the  extent of liberalization, and industries that are  part of  international sectoral
arrangements may have an interest in maintaining  the status quo. 45 Nonetheless, the general
point that multilateral liberalization  may facilitate the abolition of policies restricting market
access is as valid in the context of services as in the context of merchandise  trade.
The draft GATS also imposes costs on  "backsliding," reflected in  Article XXI on
Modification  of Schedules. This provision allows parties to withdraw concessions subject to
negotiation with -- and compensation of -- affected parties.  In the event bilateral negotiations
result in inadequate  offers of compensation  for affected  parties, the GATS  foresees  in arbitration.26
If the party withdrawing  a concession  does not comply with the suggestions  of the arbitration
panel retaliation may be authorized.  The existence of Article YXI will help governments to
oppose attempts by domestic industries and other interest groups desiring to restrict market
access at some point after liberalization  has occurred.  Of course, it should be remembered  in
this connection  that the article on emergency  safeguard  measures  remains  to be negotiated. Once
this is done - assuming parties conclude that such an article is necessary - a party will be able
to temporarily  withdraw concessions  so as to safeguard  a domestic industry.  The existence  of
such a procedure is generally  argued to facilitate  liberalization,  as it offers domestic  industries
some 'insurance."  If the impact of liberalization  is such as to cause excessive injury to an
industry - however defined - such industries may be given temporary assistance."
In the services context liberalization  does not - and often should  not - imply the abolition
of regulation.  For example, even if a government  decides to give foreign service suppliers
access to  the domestic market, such suppliers will be required to  meet domestic quality
standards.  If  qualifications, licenses, certificates, etc. issued by foreign countries are not
recognized, or if such recognition  procedures are cumbersome  and administratively  complex,
liberalization  per se may not have much of an impact.  The GATS procedures for recognition
(Article  VII) should  help governments  to cooperate  with respect to recognition  of such standards.
Finally, as discussed  earlier, the GATS  provides  for technical  assistance  for developing  countries
that desir? to liberalize  access to their markets.
Notwithstanding the  fact that the GATS will help countries to  implement domestic
liberalization efforts, it should be noted that it imposes few limitations on national policy,
leaving a contracting  party pretty much free to do as it likes in the policy domain, subject  to the
constraint that no discrimination  across alternative  sources of supply  occurs. 47 It allows parties
to implement  policies that are detrimental to -- or inconsistent  with -- economic  efficiency. A27
good example is the article specifying the conditions under which measures to safeguard the
balance-of-payments  may be taken, such measures  rarely being efficient.  It can also be noted
that the GATS does not require a participating  country to alter the regulatory  structure  of certain
service sectors, or to pursue an active antitrust or competition  policy.  However, the recent
experience  of OECD countries  indicates that liberalization  of trade and investment  may need to
be augmented  by regulatory  change  (frequently  deregulation)  and an effective  cumpetition  policy
in  order to increase the efficiency of service sectors such as  finance, transportation, and
telecommunications. As noted  by Cho (1987)  among  others, if liberalization  is simply  equated
with increased  market access for (certain)  foreign  suppliers, this may  have little  effect in markets
that are  characterized by  a lack of competition.  The main result will then simply be to
redistribute rents across firms.
Returning  to the question  posed at the beginning  of this section, membership  of the GATS
should help governments seeking to liberalize their service sectors.  It may help augment the
credibility  of unilateral regulatory reform efforts, and offers an opportunity  to go further than
might be possible unilaterally as a result of the reciprocal nature of multilateral  liberalization.
But because of the various opt out and preferential treatment  clauses, it is especially  important
for developing  countries to maximize  the sectoral coverage of their specific  commitments.
VIH. Conclusions
Many developing countries have both been active participants in  the Uruguay round
negotiations  on services  and have  engaged  in unilateral  efforts to reform their regulatory  regimes
pertaining to services and liberalize  access to service markets.  Domestic  policy developments
in major developing  countries  have led these countries to offer a substantial  number of specific
liberalization  commitments  in the Uruguay round services talks.  The contrast with developing28
country participation  in the GATT in this respect is striking, as many  countries  have still to bind
their tariffs.  However, the draft GATS contains provisions allowing developing  countries to
liberalize  less than  industrialized  countries. The economic  rationale for such  provisions  is weak,
to  say the least.  Such provisions reflect the traditional stance of developing countries in
multilateral  trade negotiations,  and do not appear to be consistent with current policy trends and
objectives  pursued by many governments  in the recent past. It is likely that inertia is one factor
explaining the inclusion of such provisions, as the major developing  countries fought hard to
obtain them in the early stages of the negotiations.
The developing  country  provisions -- especially  Article XIX permitting such countries to
offer fewer sectors -- are options or guidelines, not requirements  or obligations. Governments
that are in the process of unilateral  reform or seek to liberalize access to their service markets
are of course free to schedule  their whole service sector when acceding  to the GATS. However,
very few developing  countries have offered to schedule  even 50 per cent of their services sub-
sectors.  The cost of doing so is quite limited given the structure of the draft GATS, which
allows a member  country to continue  to maintain  whatever  measures  it wants for covered  sectors
as long as these are scheduled. Again, part of the explanation  may be inertia, in conjunction
with many smaller developing  and least developed  countries not devoting sufficient resources
to the issue of determining the appropriate regulatory regime for their service sectors.  The
mercantilistic, reciprocal nature of  the  bargaining process is  likely to  be  another factor
underlying the limited specific commitments made by most developing countries.  The draft
GATS is based on the premise the liberalization  is to be progressive. Over time the coverage
of  the specific commitments will increase as  the result of recurring reciprocal rounds of
bargaining.  The incremental nature of liberalization foreseen in the draft GATS is not a
compelling rationale for developing  countries to limit the sectoral coverage of their specific29
commitments.  This  is the case in particular for those countries that seek to enhance the
credibility of ongoing or planned services-related  regulatory  reform efforts.30
Notes
1. The text of the draft CATS is contained in GA1TI  (1991).  It is reprinted in Sauvant  and Weber (1992).
2. See Alam and Rajapatirana  (1993), United Nations and World Bank (1993), Birch and Braga (1993), and
GATT (1992) for discussions  and documentation  of recent policy changes in developing  countries.
3. And goods markets as well to the extent that cross-issue tradeoffs  could be negotiated.
4. As the focus of this paper is on developing  countries, only the positions  of the two major industrialized
traders are discussed. These dominated in any event.
S. This section is deliberately  brief, as other sources discuss the evolution  of negotiating  positions. Bhagwati
(1987), Koekkoek  and de Leouw  (1987), Feketekuty (1988), Helleiner  (1988), and Cobban (1988) focus on the
1986-87  period.  Sources for the 1988-91  period include Marconini (1990), Hindley (1990), Drake and
Nicolaidis (1992), and Stewart (1991).
6. The so-called G-10 included  most of the large and more influential  developing  countries, including  Argentina,
Brazil, Egypt, India, Nigeria, and Yugoslavia.
7. The Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration  launching the Uruguay  round stated that negotiations  on trade in
services were to establish  a multilateral  framework  of principles and rules for trade in services, 'with a view to
expansion  of such trade under conditions  of transparency  and progressive  liberalization  and as a means of
promoting economic  growth of all trading partners and the development  of developing  countries.'  The complete
text of the declaration can be found  in Annex 1 of Messerlin and Sauvant (1990).
8. The following  discussion  on initial negotiating  positions  draws on Hoekman (1988) which includes  the
citations to all ref^rences  to submissions  to the Group of Negotiations  on Services. These were obtained  from
trade officials on a December 1987 visit to Geneva, and were supplemented  by interviews.
9. Both India and Brazil argued in early submissions  to the GNS that special  and differertial treatment for
developing  countries along GATT lines should not be necessary  under a GATS  because the goal of any
acceptable agreement  should be to foster economic  development  and growth.
10. In this developing  countries were supported by the UNCTAD  secretariat, which proposed that trade in
services be defined to occur only when the majority of value added is produced by nonresidents  (UNCTAD,
1985). This definition  excludes  virtually all transactions  through FDI, as foreign factors of production  that
move are generally considered  to become residents of the host country for statistical  purposes.
11. See Marconini  (1990) and Drake and Nicolaidis (1992) for more detailed description  of the negotiating
process.
12. The text of the declaration is reproduced  in Annex 2 of Messerlin and Sauvant  (1990).
13. Stewart (1991), citing the original submission  to the GNS.
14. The intellectual  underpinnings  of this are to be found in the seminal paper by Sampson  and Snape (1985).
15. Services bought by governments  (i.e., procurement)  are also excluded for the time being from the MFN
obligation  and the negotiated  specific commitments,  but may be covered to the extent that additional
commitments  can be negotiated  (see below). Negotiations  on services procurement  are to occur within two
years of entry into force of the GATS. It should also be noted that there are ongoing multilateral  negotiations
on government  procurement  of services in the context of the GATr Govermment  Procurement  Code.  However,
this code currently has only a limited membership. For a summary discussion  of the code see Hoekman  and
Stem (1993).31
16. See Hoekman (1992) for a discussion. The annex specifies  the procedures  under which such exemptions
may be sought. It states that exemptions  be time limited (in principle lasting not longer than ten years) and are
subject to periodic review.  If it is sought to extend them beyond ten years, they are subject to negotiation  in
subsequent  trade liberalizing rounds.
17. However, certain transparency-related  obligations  apply only when specific commnittments  have been
undertaken.
18. Note that the CATS makes a provision for economic  integration, whereas the GATT only makes provision
for customs unions and free trade areas.  This is a reflection  of the wider scope of the CATS in terms of its
definition  of coverage.
19. Although  the article on balance  of payments measures  states that such actions are to be nondiscriminatory,
parties taking such action are permitted to give priority to certain sectors that are deemed more essential to their
economic or development  programs.
20.  Thus, when the countries have agreed to undertake specific commnitments  they are then listed in the
schedules - along with whatever limitations,  conditions  and qualifications  a country desires to make.  The
Article entitled Additional  Commitments  allows for commitments  to be negotiated  on measures that go beyond
the purview of the agreement, relating for example to govermment  procurement  or to qualifications,  standards
and licensing matters.
21. This is a key element because it creates a legal obligation  on the part of developed  countries.
22. Examples include UNCTAD, UNDP, UNCTC, the World Bank and sectoral agencies such as the
Intemational  Telecommunications  Union, the Intemational  Civil Aviation  Organization,  and the Intemational
Maritime Organization. Such organizations  already maintain  technical cooperation  programmes.
23. The telecommunications  annex also contains  a relatively lengthy article on technical  cooperation. It
encourages  the participation  of telecommunications  suppliers  in the development  programmes  of intemational
and regional organizations,  such as the World Bank and UNDP, and requires parties to the agreement  to
encourage and support telecommunications  cooperation  among developing  countries at the international, regional
and sub-regional  levels.  Moreover, where practicable and in cooperation  with relevant intemational
organizations,  members of the CATS are to make available to developing  countries infoimation on intemational
telecommunications  services and developments  in telecommunications  and information  technology  in order to
assist in the strengthening  of their domestic telecommunications  sectors.
24. Albeit at a price, as such exemptions  have to be 'paid'  for and are subject to negotiation.
25. A negative list approach to coverage was proposed by the U.S. in late 1989,  and was supported by the EC
(Stewart, 1991, p. 44).  As noted earlier, it appears that one element of the deal that was made in obtaining
agreement from developing  countries to accept a broad definition  of trade in services for purposes  of the CATS
was the adoption  of a positive list approach to coverage  of the specific commitments.
26. The Annex allowing for MFN exemptions  is an example of a negative list approach to determining  the
coverage of the MFN obligation.
27. However, Snape (1990) notes that a negative list approach will be somewhat  more liberal in a dynamic
sense, as new services will be covered automatically.
28. This reflected  concems on the part of the telecommunications  industry in particular, which was defended the
view that a MFN obligation  would lock in the relatively  open U.S. market and make it impossible  to use
unilateral instruments such as Section 301 as a lever to open foreign  markets.32
29. The major exception is Taiwan.  The following  developing  countries had made an initial offer as of end
1992 (in chronological  order): Hong Kong, Republic  of Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, Colombia, Mexico,
Turkey, Chile, Brazil, Yugoslavia,  Malaysia, Venezuela, China, Argentina, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Peru,
Philippires, Thailand, Egypt, Morocco, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,  Nicaragua, Cuba, India, Bolivia,
Sri Lanka, Jamaica, Nigeria, Senegal, Paraguay, Cote d'Ivoire, Israel, Cameroon, Zimbabwe,  Ghana, Tunisia,
and Trinidad and Tobago. In March 1993  the Netherlands  presented  offers on behalf of Aruba  and the
Netherlands Antilles.  The following  quantitative  analysis of the initial offers excludes that of Yugoslavia  for
obvious reasons. Confidentiality  constraints  prevent a discussion  of individual  country offers and their sectoral
coverage.
30. The major categories  are business services (including  professional  and computer-related  services),
communication  services (including postal, telecom and audiovisual  services), construction, distribution  services,
education, environmental  services, financial  services, health and related services, tourism, recreation, and
transportation. United Nations and World Bank (1993) reproduce the CATS classification  list.
31. This group includes  Brazil, China, India, the Republic  of Korea, and Mexico.
32. If an adjustment is made for sector size, the magnitude  o; the coverage  ratios will change, leading to an
increase for countries that offer relatively few sectors of significant  size, and a decrease for count,ies that offer
many sectors most of which are relatively  insignificant.
33. See United Nations and World Bank (1993) for a list of the weights used.  These are based on data obtained
for Cxnsda, France and the United States.  The more aggregated  list has 125  service sub-sectors. Note that
using data from industrialized  countries on sectoral shares is likely to bias these weighted coverage  ratios, unless
all sectors are covered.  The reason is that relative shares will on average tend to differ from those ox
industrialized  countries. Thus, transportation  and distribution  tends to be relatively  more important  for
developing  countries, and business  and financial  services less important.
34. World Bank, World Development Report 1990  GDP data broken  down by sector were used for the country-
specific service sector weights.
35. As all developing  countries together account for some 15 percent of the global output of services (excluding
Eastern European countries and the republics of the former USSR), this represents  at most ten percent of the
global market (at most because this does not take into account any restrictions  that are maintained  with respect
to the sectors  involved).  However, it can be argued that developing  country markets are likely to expand faster
than those of industrialized  nations.
36. Indeed, the only representative  many countries in this category may bave in Europe is likely to be in
Brussels  and/or Paris.
37. Large countries are the only ones where the pursuit of such a strategy  makes any sense at all, as only if
access is gained to a large market might the payoff ever outweigh  the costs of foregoing  liberalization. But
these countries are precisely those where the strategy has the least chance of succeeding.
38. A similar argument  applies to the option of pursuing  unilateral  domestic liberalization  efforts but not binding
these multilaterally. While this entails much lower direct costs - the primary one being that trading partners
will perhaps offer less liberalization  of their markets - the indirect  costs may be substantial. The main
advantage  of binding is that it signals  the 'irreversibility' of liberalization  to domestic  agents.  Once bound,
costs will be incurred if the government  attempts to re-impose  discriminatory  measures.
39. The EC accounts for about 40 percent of world trade in services - measured on a balance of payments  basis -
while the U.S. accounts for approximately  13 percent. If intra-EC trade flows are excluded,  the figures
become 29 percent and 17 percent, respectively.33
40. The difference between  the U.S. and EC offers is largely due to the fact that the EC has offered to make
commitments  on many transportation  services, whereas the U.S. has not.  There are 35 transportation  services
in the GNS list.  If offers are evaluated excluding all transport  activities, the resulting  coverage ratios for the
EC and the U.S. become virtually identical  (around 50 per cent).
41. See also the seminal investigation  by Sapir and Lutz (1981), later complemented  by Sapir (1986).
42. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the OECD codes at length.  See Geiger (1990) for brief
discussions  of these and related instruments.
43. See United Nations and World Bank (1993).
4A. However, as noted earlier, there are some disciplines  on subsidies  through the national treatment  obligation
that applies to scheduled  service sectors.
45. For a general discussion  of the possible impact of these factors on the political economy of multilateral
liberalization  of trade in services, see Hoekman  (1992).
46. The design of the safeguards article is of crucial importance, as the criteria for invoking  it will determine
the extent to which it is likely to be invoked and the degree to which it may acts more as a 'loophole' than as a
safeguard. See Hoekman  (1993) for a discussion.
47. This assumes that the specific obligations  of the GATS  apply.  To the extent that sectors are not scheduled,
a country only has to avoid  discriminating  acrossforeign  sources of supply.34
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